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In July 1960, John F. Kennedy received a letter from Africa congratulating
him on winning the Democratic Party’s nomination for the upcoming American
presidential election.

A plea for help accompanied the congratulation.

“Everywhere there are more and more [unintelligible word] Communists!
Western prestige has slipped.
before its too late!” 1

Everywhere

So for heaven’s sake change the image of America

The Democratic nominee had already established a

reputation across Africa as a sympathetic supporter of African nationalism, who
if elected would realign Washington’s priorities toward the continent.

Once in

office, Kennedy indeed made changing the image of America in the Third World a
top priority of his administration.
John F. Kennedy was the first, perhaps only, American president to make a
pointed effort to court African nationalism. He did so partly on moral grounds,
but strategic considerations were far more important.

JFK believed Third World

nationalism would become one of the most potent political forces in the second
half of the 20th century.

In fact, he believed that the growth of Third World

nationalism might one day tip the balance of power in the Cold War.

For this

reason he made it a priority of his administration to attempt to influence the
nationalists of the developing world into aligning with the United States in its
global contest against the Soviet Union.

He used all means at his disposal –

economic, cultural, personal – to appeal to the leaders of the developing world.
Kennedy’s focus in this effort centered on Africa, and he set out to court the
nationalists of that continent. 2
Scholars such as Thomas Noer, Peter Schraeder, David Dickson, and Gabriel
Kolko contend that nothing substantial changed in U.S. foreign policy towards
Africa during Kennedy’s administration. 3
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support for African nationalism during the 1960 Presidential campaign was little
more than a shrewd political move in an effort to appeal to liberals and blacks –
two groups that were unenthusiastic about his candidacy.

These detractors assert

that African affairs never became more than a peripheral concern for Kennedy, due
to the fact that his worldview was dominated by the importance of sustaining a
cohesive NATO and winning the Cold War. 4
A closer look at Kennedy’s legacy shows that he changed United States
foreign policy towards Africa in both rhetoric and substance.

Kennedy devoted

more time and effort toward relations with Africa than any other American
President.

His willingness to aid any African nation regardless of its political

orientation clearly separates him from any other man who has occupied the Oval
Office.

Unlike Truman and Eisenhower, Kennedy supported rather than stunted

African independence.

Furthermore, in stark contrast to the later

administrations of either Ford or Reagan, Kennedy was committed to arms
limitation on the African continent in an attempt to keep the Cold War from
getting “hot” in Africa. 5
Dickson is correct when he argues that Kennedy’s worldview caused him to
obsess over winning the Cold War.

However, Kennedy’s drive to win the Cold War

was in no way contradictory to his desire to support African nationalism.

In

fact, he believed that courting African nationalism was essential for competing
in the Cold War and that both goals could be pursued simultaneously.

He saw the

Third World as the decisive battlefield of the Cold War, and criticized the
leadership of Dwight D. Eisenhower for having ignored the “sleeping giant” of
African nationalism.

The new President proclaimed:

The great battleground for the defense and expansion of freedom today,
is the whole southern half of the globe – Asia, Latin America, Africa,
and the Middle East – the lands of the rising peoples. Their revolution
is the greatest in human history. They seek an end to injustice,
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tyranny and exploitation.

More than an end, they seek a beginning. 6

One of the most significant differences in the manner in which Kennedy and
Eisenhower fought the Cold War was that JFK perceived befriending Third World
nationalism as a necessity, while Eisenhower thought it was desirable but was not
willing to go out of his way to do so.

This is especially true in any instance

when Eisenhower believed potential U.S.-Third World relations would cause a rift
in his relations with NATO allies.
Kennedy’s belief that the Cold War would be won or lost in the Third World
was profoundly influenced by a speech made by Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev
on January 6, 1961, only days before Kennedy took the presidential oath.
Khrushchev said it was the “historical mission” of world Communism to assist
“wars of national liberation” in an attempt to end colonialism:
A remarkable phenomenon of our time is the awakening of the peoples
of Africa…Communists are revolutionaries, and it would be unfortunate
if they did not take advantage of new opportunities and did not look
for new methods and forms that would best achieve the ends in view. 7

Kennedy took Khrushchev’s speech seriously, reading portions of it aloud during
the first meeting of his National Security Council and distributing copies to his
entire staff.

“It was a significant event in our lives,” Secretary of Defense

Robert McNamara later remembered. 8
The State Department later concluded that Africa was “the greatest open
field of maneuver in the world-wide competition between the [Communist] Bloc and
the non-Communist world.” 9

The President was firmly convinced that Africa had

surpassed Asia as the most permeable battlefield in the East-West Cold War
struggle.
It is therefore impossible to separate Kennedy’s desire to win the Cold War
from his desire to court African nationalism.
6
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conservative scholar of the Cold War in the Third World, concludes that it is
impractical “to separate the generous program for Africa from the hope that it
would appeal to the continent’s peoples as a more attractive alternative to the
Soviet and Chinese challenge to which Kennedy himself had so passionately called
attention in the early months of 1961.” 10
Kennedy had first established a reputation of opposing Western colonialism
and supporting African nationalist movements while representing the state of
Massachusetts in the United States Senate from 1947-1960.

In 1957 he gave a

controversial speech on the floor of the Senate denouncing the French war in
Algeria, as well as the Eisenhower administration’s uncritical support of French
colonialism.

Kennedy charged that by ignoring the aspirations of Africans to

govern their own independent nations, the Republicans were pushing the peoples of
the underdeveloped world into the hands of the Communists.

Kennedy declared that

“the most powerful single force in the world today is neither Communism nor
Capitalism, neither the H-bomb nor the guided missile – it is man’s eternal
desire to be free and independent.” 11
Kennedy hypothesized that further French attempts to silence their colonies
“eternal desires” for freedom would lead to the radicalization of African
nationalist movements.

He feared that denying self-determination to nationalists

would push Third World intellectuals towards Marxism, which would have the effect
of turning nationalists into Communists.

For Kennedy, the challenge of dealing

with European imperialism was “the single most important test of American foreign
policy today.” 12
The New York Times called the speech “the most comprehensive and outspoken
arraignment of Western policy toward Algeria yet presented by an American in
public office.” 13
see in Washington.

As a result, Kennedy became the man for African diplomats to
Many commented on their satisfaction in reading the speech as

well as the impact that it had on young African intellectuals. 14
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By 1958 Kennedy had become the chairman of the Senate’s Foreign Relations
African subcommittee and continually pressed the White House with the importance
of initiating contact with African nationalist leaders.

“Call it nationalism,

call it anti-colonialism, call it what you will, the word is out and spreading
like wildfire in nearly a thousand languages and dialects – that it is no longer
necessary to remain forever in bondage.” 15

“After all,” Kennedy mused, “it was in

our schools that some of the most renowned African leaders learned…the virtues of
representative government, widespread education, and economic opportunity.
are the ideas and ideals that have caused a revolution.” 16

These

President Eisenhower,

however, showed little interest in cultivating relationships with African
nationalists.

While Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev shook the hands of new

African heads of state at the United Nations in 1960, the American President
chose instead to go on a golfing vacation. 17
In order to maintain the unity of NATO, President Eisenhower allowed U.S.
policy toward Africa to be determined in London, Paris, and Lisbon.

His African

policy was little more than an extension of the Marshall Plan, predicated upon
ensuring that African resources remained accessible to Western Europe’s recovery
from World War II. 18

Assistant Secretary of State Henry Byroade warned that, “a

sudden break in economic relations [between Europe and Africa] might seriously
injure the European economies upon which our Atlantic system depends.” 19
Throughout his Presidency Eisenhower remained committed to this policy despite
the advice of the Chairman of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy, who
observed that Africans were, “offended by this policy, and regard it as a new
form of colonialism, and exploitation by the United States.” 20
Eisenhower, however, cared little about what Africans thought.

His National

Security Council concluded that Africans were unprepared for independence since,
“the African is still immature and unsophisticated.” 21
15
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hostile towards “premature independence” and referred to the 1960 arrival of
independence in Africa as a “destructive hurricane.” 22

In fact, in his memoirs a

series of maps showing the evolution of African independence is titled “African
Upheaval.” 23
Kennedy believed that Eisenhower’s refusal to support neither anticolonialism nor African neutralism was costing the United States popularity
throughout the Third World – as well as the Cold War.

The young Senator thought

it inevitable that Africans would eventually attain freedom from European
control; the question was with which Cold War bloc these newly independent states
would align.

Eisenhower’s indifference seemed to be pushing them towards the

Soviet sphere.
By 1960 it appeared to Kennedy as if the Soviet Union, fresh off winning the
race to be first into outer space and bolstered by a perceived nuclear parity,
was gaining ground in the hearts of the underdeveloped world.

The Soviets had

invested billions of dollars to fund Third World projects such as the Aswan Dam
in Egypt, steel mills in India, and significant military aid to the government of
Indonesia and Algerian rebels.

The Cuban nationalist revolutionary, Fidel

Castro, had turned to the Soviet camp as well.

Moreover, while Dwight Eisenhower

labeled African independence a “destructive hurricane,” Soviet Premier Nikita
Khrushchev called such national independence movements “sacred.”

It was becoming

increasingly evident to the Third World that Moscow supported nationalism, while
Washington merely supported anti-Communism.
Kennedy asked Harris Wofford to help Theodore Sorensen (Kennedy’s chief aide
and speechwriter) draft new foreign policy speeches incorporating the candidate’s
view of the importance of the Third World, and downplaying the need for
Washington to view the world through the eyes of its European allies.

Kennedy

told Wofford:
The key thing for the country is a new foreign policy that will break
out of the confines of the cold war. Then we can build a decent
relationship with developing nations and begin to respond to their needs.
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We can stop the vicious circle of the arms race and promote diversity and
peaceful change within the Soviet bloc…The most likely alternatives [to
Kennedy being nominated as the Democratic candidate] are [Lyndon] Johnson or
[Stuart] Symington, but if either of them is nominated we might as well elect
Dulles or Acheson; it would be the same cold-war foreign policy all over
again. 24

In 1960, for the first (and probably last) time in history, Africa figured
prominently in an American presidential election.

Kennedy repeatedly attacked

the Eisenhower-Nixon administration’s record on Africa, making 479 references to
the continent during his 1960 campaign speeches. 25

Kennedy argued that:

We have lost ground in Africa because we have neglected and ignored the
needs and the aspirations of the African people – because we failed to
foresee the emergence of Africa and ally ourselves with the causes of
independence… 26

On the campaign trail Kennedy repeatedly stressed the low number of
scholarships Washington had awarded to black Africa, as well as the low number of
Foreign Service personnel stationed there (less than in West Germany alone).

JFK

criticized the Republican leadership for turning its back on the nationalist
movements of the world who had typically been inspired by the American Revolution
and its values.

“There are children in Africa named Thomas Jefferson, George

Washington, and Abraham Lincoln.

There are none called Lenin or Trotsky or

Stalin – or Nixon.” 27
Yet despite his record of support for Africa, some African leaders such as
Egypt’s Gamal Abdul Nasser, had initially hoped that Kennedy’s opponent, Richard
M. Nixon, would win the American presidency.

Nasser’s support stemmed from the

fact that Nixon was Eisenhower’s Vice President during the Suez Crisis, and
“Egypt could feel nothing but gratitude toward both men [Nixon and Eisenhower]
for the position they took in 1956.” 28

After he watched the first televised

debate between the two candidates his opinion of the two men soon changed,
24
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however.

Nasser was impressed with the Democratic candidate’s apparent desire to

understand the Third World.

From that point onward Nasser decided that it was in

Egypt’s interest for Kennedy to win the election. 29
Additionally, Kennedy made a number of dramatic gestures to demonstrate his
interest in Africa.

When the Eisenhower administration declined to do anything

to help African students who had scholarships from American universities but
could not afford their travel fares to the United States, Kennedy arranged for
the Joseph Kennedy Foundation to pay for their trip.

When Guinea’s President

Sékou Touré requested a meeting with the Democratic candidate, Kennedy rented a
helicopter to fly the African leader to Disneyland where the two held a wellpublicized meeting.
Kennedy’s campaign speeches and actions had sent a message of hope to the
Third World.

The Algerian Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) held a vigil

during the morning of November 9, 1960 to listen to the returns of the United
States presidential election.

There was cheering throughout the camp when John

F. Kennedy had pulled ahead, but cursing when it appeared that Nixon might
overtake him. 30

When the final results of the election began to reach the rest of

Africa, they were greeted with waves of exhilaration and optimism.

Kennedy’s

narrow victory had provided Africans with the anticipation of a better future for
their continent.
President Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt was filled with a renewed sense of
hope that he would finally be able to come to a genuine understanding with
Washington. 31

Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah wrote to the American President-

elect expressing that he looked forward to “complete kinship” between the two
heads of state. 32

Senator Frank Church noticed a similar response from the masses

while traveling through Africa a month after the election.

“Whenever our

presence became known, eager crowds would gather to shout, ‘Kennedy, Kennedy’…For

29
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the first time, our country was being identified, Arab and Black alike, with
legitimate African aspirations.” 33

It was clear:

(F)rom the excitement that Ted Kennedy (who accompanied Church and other
congressmen on the trip), although he was not yet a member of the Senate,
elicited wherever we went, because he was known to be the new president’s brother.
And besides, of course, he had the Kennedy appearance, and was easily identified.
There was an excitement throughout Africa at the time about Kennedy and some
understanding that he had shown more interest in African affairs than previous
presidents. 34

Kennedy became the thirty-fifth President of the United States of America
during an exciting and optimistic time in Africa.

The first wave of African

independence had begun on March 6, 1957, when Kwame Nkrumah led Ghana away from
its colonial past and to independence.

By the time of Kennedy’s inauguration on

January 20, 1961, the dismantlement of the French colonial empire had resulted in
the independence of an additional eighteen African states.

Kennedy’s sympathy

for African nationalism, both as a Senator and on the 1960 campaign trail, had
helped swell the African continent with hope that under his leadership the United
States would be more responsive to its needs.
After winning the election Kennedy wasted no time in fulfilling his campaign
promise to pay more attention to Africa.

In December 1960, one month prior to

taking office, Kennedy assigned a task force to study U.S. African policy.

The

task force discarded the idea that Africa was still a dependent of Europe and an
area of non-interest for America.

The task force report recognized African

aspirations for independence, self-determination, economic development, and Cold
War non-alignment – and suggested ways in which the United States could help
facilitate these objectives. 35

Clearly, this indicated that the administration

intended to take a new and serious look at Africa.
The importance of Africa to Kennedy was vividly illustrated by the fact that
his first State Department appointment was G. Mennen “Soapy” Williams as
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.

Williams was a long time

advocate of civil rights in the United States, and shared with Kennedy a common
33
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vision of what America’s role in Africa should be.

Kennedy thought highly enough

of the former progressive Governor of Michigan, that before naming him to head
the African Bureau he considered Williams for Secretary of State.
indicated a new emphasis on the importance of African policy.

The selection

Kennedy described

Williams’ post as “a position of responsibility second to none in the new
administration.” 36

It became obvious that during the Kennedy presidency the State

Department’s Bureau of Western European Affairs would no longer determine U.S.
policies towards Africa.
Other prominent Africanists received important positions within the
administration.

Former Presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson was appointed

United Nations Ambassador.

Chester Bowles became Undersecretary of State and

later Kennedy’s Ambassador-at-large to the Third World.

Kennedy also made an

attempt to place ambassadors in African capitals that embodied the spirit of his
New Frontier.

The newly elected President replaced many Foreign Service

bureaucrats and political appointees with young non-career professionals. 37
Unlike many of their predecessors, men like William Attwood in Guinea, John
Badeau in Egypt, and Edmund Gullion in the Congo, had “been out in the world,
spoke the necessary languages, were conversant with foreign affairs,” and held
views that they “could articulate with conviction.” 38

Kennedy’s African

ambassadors understood the languages, cultures, and problems of their posts.
These new ambassadors were well received by African heads of state, who respected
their ability to speak the local language as well as their personal access to
Kennedy.
Even more important was the fact that these men actually wanted to serve in
the countries to which they were assigned.

William Attwood recalled in his

memoirs that prior to leaving for his assignment as the Ambassador to Guinea, a
journalist jokingly told him, “You must have written some lousy speeches for Jack
to be sent to that dump.”
36
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prestigious” posts – but turned them down and specifically asked to go to
Conakry. 39

Eisenhower’s representatives to Africa, as well as the majority of

ambassadors from Communist states, too often thought of Africa as an undesirable
“hardship” post.

Africans easily sensed this, and did not like it.

typical of Kennedy’s New Frontier ambassadors.

40

Attwood was

They were men eager to accept the

new and unknown challenge of fighting the Cold War in post-colonial Africa.
With his ambassadors in place and building from the recommendations of his
African task force, President Kennedy implemented a four-pronged approach to
court African nationalism.

His policy was to oppose European colonialism, accept

African non-alignment, initiate economic programs to help aid in Africa’s
development, and launch personal diplomacy to build a working relationship
between himself and the leaders of Africa’s independence movement.
The Kennedy administration made a concerted effort to disengage itself from
the African policies of its European allies.

Making a huge departure in U.S.

foreign policy, the young President resolutely declared that America was on the
side of those seeking independence in the Third World.
greatest in human history.

“Their revolution is the

They seek an end to injustice, tyranny, and

exploitation.” 41
Within a month of taking office, President Kennedy had met with the National
Security Council to revise the operating procedures for U.S. policy toward
Africa.

Kennedy argued that it was imperative for Washington to discard the

Eisenhower policy of deferring U.S. African policy to its European allies.

On

February 13 1961, Kennedy signed National Security Action Memorandum No. 16,
which provided “flexibility for the United States to supplement Western support
to newly-independent areas whenever such action constitutes a revision of State
interest.” 42

Writing to the President two days later, Secretary of State Dean

Rusk noted that the new policy would allow the White House the elasticity to
pursue its own African policy. 43
39
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Backed by Kennedy’s support, administration staffers were frank in their
support of decolonization.

Shortly after taking office, G. Mennen Williams

created a small controversy when he proclaimed “Africa for the Africans,” a
vision for the continent in which Africans would control their own political
destiny.

This statement created a furor amongst both the press and

“Europeanists” within the administration and Congress.

President Kennedy,

however, stood by his Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and
responded in a March 1, 1961 press conference, “I do not know who else Africa
should be for.” 44
This was not merely airy rhetoric, as early as the summer of 1961 the new
administration began pressuring Portugal on self-determination for its African
territories. 45

Responding to Portugal’s suppression of a rebellion in Angola, the

U.S. backed a United Nations resolution advocating Angolan self-determination.
The administration further pressured the Portuguese by terminating commercial
arms sales to Lisbon, reducing its military aid program to that country from $25
million to $3 million, and authorizing the CIA to initiate modest financial
support to Angolan nationalists.

Clearly the days of allowing a NATO ally a free

hand in Africa had come to an end.
The second element of Kennedy’s policy towards Africa was to accept African
Cold War neutrality.

Kennedy was opposed to the famous John Foster Dulles

principle, which held that any neutralism was a “transitional stage to
Communism.”

JFK feared that ostracizing Third World nationals would only provide

“an open invitation to the Soviet Union to exploit discontent and hunger”
throughout the developing world. 46

“To dismiss or denounce these men [Third World

nationalists] for every foolish thing they said or did, to cut off our aid food
shipments every time they aroused our displeasure,…would only play into the hands
of the Communists.” 47
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Kennedy believed that “real” neutralism, which he defined as neutralism
consisting of balanced criticism of both the United States and the Soviet Union,
was acceptable.

“We shall not always expect to find them [non-aligned countries]

supporting our view.

But we shall always hope to find them strongly supporting

their own freedom.” 48

Citing America’s own neutralist past as an example, he

stated that a policy of neutrality made good sense for newly independent and
underdeveloped nations who were engrossed with their own internal troubles.

“If

neutrality is the result of a concentration on internal problems, raising the
standard of living of the people and so forth, particularly in the underdeveloped
countries, I would accept that.” 49
Kennedy’s pre-inauguration task force concluded that the “non-alignment of
African states in the Cold War is in no sense detrimental to our interests.” 50

In

fact, the task force argued that Cold War non-alignment would work in America’s
favor because the United States “welcomed diversity, but the Communists cannot.” 51
The new administration theorized that the United States could win the Cold War in
Africa simply by preventing its newly independent nations from going Communist.
A third aspect of Kennedy’s African policy was to assist in that continent’s
development by raising the African standard of living through U.S. aid and trade.
Kennedy was skeptical of sending military aid to Africa or demanding that African
countries fight against Communism without first alleviating the continent’s
economic misery.

The first step in aiding Africa, Kennedy proclaimed, was to

“cure the social chaos in which Communism has always thrived.” 52
The President and his staff hypothesized that through modernization, African
nations would grow into economic and political maturity.

Economic stability

would lead to political stability, which in turn would prevent Communist
subversion.

Kennedy stated the importance of U.S. aid to African development:

If African progress falters because of a lack of capital and education,
if these new states and emerging peoples turn bitter in their
independence, then the reason will be that the Western powers, by
48
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indifference or lack of imagination, have failed to see that it is their
own future that is at stake. 53

The Peace Corps was the cornerstone of Kennedy’s Third World development
plan.

The logic behind the creation of the Peace Corps was two fold; it provided

grass roots humanitarian aid (on African terms) while at the same time acted as a
counterweight to the work of Eastern Bloc professionals – doctors, engineers,
teachers – who Kennedy saw as “missionaries for international Communism.” 54
While the Peace Corps fell short in terms of improving African living
standards, it became arguably the most successful foreign policy strategy for
improving America’s image in the Third World.

Peace Corps monuments such as

irrigation systems, water pumps, and higher crop yields won the United States
respect and admiration amongst Africans and successfully won the Cold War
propaganda campaign against Khrushchev’s ‘missionaries.’
The fourth, but ultimately most important, facet of President Kennedy’s
approach in dealing with Africa was his use of personal diplomacy with the
leaders of that continent.

When Kennedy took office in January 1961 the United

Nations General Assembly was in plenary session.

Leaders from across the world

were in New York City and virtually all wanted to visit the new American
President.
Africans.

Kennedy made it clear to his staff that he wanted to meet with
“If African leaders want to meet me, good.

Invite them down here

unofficially.” 55
Many Africans came to visit Kennedy on that occasion, and they would
continue to visit the White House at an unprecedented pace throughout Kennedy’s
tenure.

Kennedy opened up his 1600 Pennsylvania mansion to receive eleven

African leaders in 1961, ten in 1962, and another seven in 1963. 56

With his

natural charm, grace, and informality he was able to put his African guests at
ease by conveying to them his profound sympathy for African nationalism.

He won

the admiration of African leaders by attempting to see African problems not as an
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ally of the European colonial powers, but as the Africans themselves saw their
problems.
Although Kennedy had little prior contact with either Africans or African
Americans prior to assuming the presidency, American Civil Rights activist James
Meredith believed that in personal terms, he was the first American president who
was not a racist. 57

Likewise, scholar Thomas Borstlemann concludes that the

generational contrast between Kennedy and Eisenhower was most pronounced in the
way in which they related to individuals with darker skin. 58

This may account for

why Kennedy was much more at ease in his personal relations with African
nationalists than any of his predecessors had been.

This distinction in attitude

and treatment was easily noticed and appreciated by Kennedy’s African guests.
Further impressing his African guests was Kennedy’s remarkable knowledge of
Africa.

He was well-versed in African history, could refer to African

personalities and issues, cite statistics and facts, and discuss in detail the
various members of a leader’s governmental cabinet.

G. Mennen Williams

remembered introducing the President to African leaders:
[A]fter the two had shaken hands and talked together a few minutes,
seeing him walk to a globe in the corner of the office, twirl it, and
haltingly put his finger on that leader’s country. (Alternatively, I
imagine that one or two African leaders or ambassadors may well have
asked him with corresponding uncertainty, “Where is Massachusetts?”)
This unaffected, ingenuous approach impressed Africans deeply. 59

This led some Africans to say after their meeting with Kennedy that the
“American President knew more about their countries than they did themselves.” 60
After each White House meeting the visiting dignitary was brought upstairs to the
Kennedy family’s private quarters and introduced to the President’s wife and
children – an action that deeply touched Kennedy’s foreign visitors. 61

Somali

Prime Minister Abdirashid Ali Shermarke later remembered that Kennedy possessed a
unique ability “to make himself a friend – immediately.”
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respect for the man, an unlimited respect for the man, beyond any doubt,”
Shermarke said of his meeting with the American President. 62
The National Security Council recognized how much Africans appreciated the
attention Kennedy gave them and concluded that America’s most important asset in
dealing with African nationalists was, “the President’s status and personal
relations” with African leaders, “on which we can draw heavily.” 63

Administration

staff member Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. remembered Kennedy’s warm relationship with
African leaders:
One after another, they left his presence with admiration for his
“sensibility”, pride in what they now felt to be a special relationship,
a conviction that Kennedy’s America, even if it could not do everything
at once, was basically with them, and, most of all, a fascination with
Kennedy himself. 64

Kennedy’s personal diplomacy was further supplemented by the efforts of G.
Mennen Williams.

The head of the State Department’s African Bureau made several

trips to Africa meeting with Africa’s leaders and serving as Kennedy’s personal
representative. 65

Williams and his wife traveled through Africa with the same

vigor they showed in campaigning through Michigan.

The couple:

…toured Africa as they had toured every county in Michigan. No African
nation was too small or politically insignificant for them, just as no
Michigan town or county had been too small for the governor to visit.
During the 1960s, Africa was changing rapidly and gaining the world’s
attention. Mennen and Nancy made many friends there on behalf of the
United States. 66

Through his personal contacts with African leaders, Williams was able to “correct
the views of U.S. African policy and thereby increase good will toward the U.S.” 67
In his first year in office Kennedy more than doubled U.S. economic aid to
Africa, expanded the U.S. diplomatic presence on the continent, made a deliberate
effort to meet with African dignitaries, and launched new American foreign policy
62
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initiatives.

All of these actions were undertook in an attempt to court African

nationalism.
Throughout his term in office Kennedy continued this policy of courting
African nationalism.

Prior to his inauguration the Eisenhower administration had

already written off countries such as Guinea, Egypt, and Ghana as hopelessly lost
to the Soviet orbit.

But by late 1962 Kwame Nkrumah and Gamal Abdul Nasser felt

that Kennedy was the only western leader that they could trust.

Guinea’s Sékou

Touré referred to Kennedy as his “best friend in the outside world” and said that
the, “Guinean people now regard America as their best friend.” 68

In Algeria, a

country whose independence from France Eisenhower had tried to prevent, Kennedy
had attained an almost folk hero stature for the way in which he had supported
Algerian self-determination.

Ben Bella and the rest of the Algerian government

could not help but be eternally grateful for Kennedy’s 1957 stand in support of
their cause.

These were not isolated incidents, for such success stories were

replicated all across the African continent, at great benefit to U.S. foreign
policy. 69
John F. Kennedy saw Africa as an arena of considerable Cold War rivalry in
which vigorous American involvement was essential.

The courting of Africa’s

nationalist leaders was one of the key foreign policy initiatives of his
administration.

Although the recurring intrusion of Cold War crises in such

places as Berlin, Cuba, and Vietnam hampered his activism, he still managed to
successfully realign American diplomacy towards Africa to accommodate the needs
and aspirations of the leaders of that continent.
The arguments made by Noer and Kolko that Kennedy’s African policy did not
differ much from the policies of previous administrations simply do not hold
true. 70

Such assessments ignore the numerous changes he made in U.S. policy

towards Africa.

Kennedy aide Theodore Sorensen wrote that Kennedy “succeeded

beyond his own expectations in dispelling the notion that the United States was

68

Touré quoted by Attwood, The Reds and the Blacks, p. 129.
I am currently working on my PhD dissertation at The George Washington University in which I use case studies to examine
Kennedy’s relations with Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana), Sékou Touré (Guinea), Gamal Abdul Nasser (Egypt), Ahmed Ben Bella (Algeria),
William Tubman (Liberia), Julius Nyerere (Tanzania), and Felix Houphouët-Boigny (Ivory Coast).
70
Noer, “New Frontiers and Old Priorities in Africa,” and Kolko.
69

18

unconcerned, conservative, and committed to the status quo.” 71

During the Kennedy

Presidency, the United States was for the first time viewed as being sympathetic
to the aspirations of Third World nationalism.

In Africa, Kennedy became well

respected for his aggressive efforts to find common ground with popular PanAfricanist leaders like Sékou Touré, Gamal Abdul Nasser, and Kwame Nkrumah.
Despite the reservations of both his NATO allies and domestic political
opponents, Kennedy wholeheartedly courted these ‘radical’ African leaders.

He

did so because he felt that it was not only the right thing to do, but also in
his country’s national interest.
Senator Frank Church proclaimed that Kennedy was “the first American
president to take a personal interest in African affairs.

He understood the

importance of the collapse of colonialism on that continent, the emergence of the
independent governments, and the need for the United States to establish good
relations with these governments.” 72

Kennedy’s Ambassador to Guinea wrote:

As for African policy during the Kennedy Administration, the main changes
were that we began to talk to Africans about Africa as Americans and not as
junior partners of France and England. Also we became less suspicious of
nonalignment. So far as Africans were concerned, these changes did add up
to a new policy. 73

Africans sensed a genuine sincerity in Kennedy’s sympathy for their cause.
For Africans it was JFK’s words that spoke louder than his actions.

Senegalese

President Léopold Sédar Senghor said that after Kennedy’s 1957 speech on Algeria
there was no doubt in Africans’ minds where the future American President’s
sympathies lie. 74

Africans “considered that Mr. Kennedy’s political attitudes

were even more important than his efforts to aid their economies.” 75

According to

Senghor, “African chiefs of state had a feeling of great esteem, I can even say,
great admiration, for President Kennedy.” 76

Julius Nyerere, Ahmed Ben Bella,

Kwame Nkrumah, and others understood that at times global Cold War considerations
and the democratic nature of the American political system prevented Kennedy from
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doing as much for their continent as he would have liked to.

Nonetheless,

Africans were touched that a Western leader would show concern for their plight,
and were overcome with grief after learning of the American President’s
assassination.
The news of Kennedy’s assassination spread rapidly through Africa – from
Algiers to Dar es Salaam, Cairo to Accra, and even in the most distant and
isolated villages, Africans mourned.

In Nairobi, Kenya for example, six thousand

people packed a cathedral for the American President’s memorial service. 77

Kenyan

leader Tom Mboya said that the news of Kennedy’s death was deeply felt in his
country:
[T]he shock that was registered in this country was particularly noticeable
because it was the first time that the death of a foreigner, and a foreign
head of State, had registered so sharply. It was as though someone very close
at home had died and people reacted spontaneously in practically every little town
and village in this country…I saw very clearly that President Kennedy’s
personality had penetrated deep in the villages quite remote from the normal
political atmosphere of the country…[In Africa] President Kennedy offered much
excitement and hope in the future. [Africans] saw in him a young man who
understood the modern world and the problems of the younger generation… Another
thing is that people saw in President Kennedy, in Africa at any rate, a very
enlightened approach insofar as the Cold War was concerned…[Kennedy] gave the
world that much more hope. 78

Days after the tragic events that took place in Dallas, the British
Ambassador to the Ivory Coast telegraphed London that Kennedy would soon join
Patrice Lumumba as an African martyr.

The American President, he concluded, had

“captured the imagination of the Africans both because of his youth and
‘dynamism’ and because they regarded him as responsible for the policy of
standing up to the (racism in the American) South.”

Her Majesty’s representative

in Abidjan ended his dispatch by predicting that if Lyndon Johnson continued
JFK’s policies towards Africa, “the President’s death may be found to have given
quite a boost to the American effort in this part of the world.” 79
Sadly Johnson did not maintain JFK’s policy of courting African
nationalists.

Yet despite the fact that American policy makers have neglected

Africa for so long following his death, Africans still fondly remember the legacy
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of John F. Kennedy.

Sargent Shriver wrote how common it was for him to walk into

an African village hut, after his brother-in-law’s death, and find a picture of
President Kennedy – torn from a newspaper and placed beside the family album or
mementos. 80

Visiting Ethiopia, Kenya, and Ghana in the late 1980s, Harris Wofford

found “that in the homes of ordinary people no other American president or world
leader had joined the faded photographs of John Kennedy.” 81
Streets, schools, and parks all across Africa were renamed in honor of the
slain American President, and his likeness soon graced African currency and
stamps.

Kennedy’s Ambassador to Guinea wrote:
[T]he President, as I say, was very good at personal diplomacy, and I’m sure
that had he had the chance, eventually, to go to Africa, he could have accomplished
a great deal. I’ve found out, after returning to Africa since his death, that
the Kennedy legend is very great, and a lot of the good will for our policies is
still due to what he said and did in those two-and-a-half years…For example, there
are many people in Kenya named after him. Even though he was never in Kenya, many
people felt that he was the first American leader who ever really understood Africa. 82

Since the end of the Cold War, the American foreign policy establishment has
increasingly shown less desire to court the Third World.

In fact, contemporary

U.S. foreign policy is very condescending towards the developing world.
Washington may be making a mistake by seemingly dismissing the growing strength
of anti-Americanism throughout the world.

The importance of courting Third World

nationalism is as important today as Kennedy believed it to have been in the
early 1960s.

Perhaps future American policy makers can learn a lesson from John

F. Kennedy’s policy of courting African nationalism.

The goodwill that was

created by his strategy of befriending nationalists has proven to be more
effective and long lasting than trying to curry favor through the use of economic
or military aid.

If Third World nationalists turn bitter against the “New World

Order” currently being constructed by Washington, “then the reason will be that
the Western powers, by indifference or lack of imagination, have failed to see
that it is their own future that is at stake.” 83
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